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A Gentzen sequent alulus for Lax Logi is presented, the proofs in whih naturally
orrespond in a 1{1 way to the normal natural dedutions for the logi. The propositional
fragment of this alulus is used as the basis for another alulus, one whih uses a
history mehanism in order to give a deision proedure for propositional Lax Logi.
1. Introdution and Bakground
Proof searh an be used with either of two meanings. It an either be used to mean
the searh for all proofs of a formula (proof enumeration), or to mean the searh for
a yes/no answer to a query (theorem proving). This paper desribes two new sequent
aluli for Lax Logi. One alulus is for proof enumeration for quantied Lax Logi, the
other alulus is for theorem proving in propositional Lax Logi.
Lax Logi is an intuitionisti modal logi rst introdued by Curry (Curry, 1952)
to illustrate ut-elimination in the presene of modalities. The logi was redisovered
by Mendler, who developed the logi in the ontext of hardware veriation to enable
abstrat veriation of iruits (Mendler, 1993). The logi has a single modality (Æ,
somehow) axiomatised by
S  ÆS; Æ Æ S  ÆS; (S  T )  (ÆS  ÆT )
The modality is unusual in having properties of both neessity and possibility. It an
be thought of as expressing orretness up to a onstraint, abstrating away from the
detail (hene the hoie of name, Lax Logi). A formula ÆP an be read as \for some
onstraint , P holds under ". The proof theory and semantis of Lax Logi, inluding
Gentzen aluli, natural dedution aluli and Kripke semantis, are further developed
in (Fairtlough and Mendler, 1997; Fairtlough and Walton, 1997; Benton et al., 1998).
The ability of Lax Logi to give an abstrat expression of onstraints has been utilised
both in hardware veriation and to give a proof theoreti semantis for onstraint logi
programming languages. In hardware veriation, the timing onstraints that need to be
satised in a iruit an be abstrated away as instanes of the modality and reasoned
about separately from the logial analysis of the iruit (Mendler, 1993; Fairtlough and
Mendler, 1994). In onstraint logi programming, Lax Logi has been used to extend the
view of logi programming as bakwards proof searh in onstrutive logis (Miller et al.,
y
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1991). In essene, this approah takes normal natural dedution as the proof theoreti
semantis for logi programming. Constraints an be abstrated away as modalities and
the query an be reasoned about logially. The logi is used to give proofs of queries.
In turn, these proofs give the onstraints to be satised. The onstraints an then be
analysed separately (Fairtlough et al., 1997; Walton, 1998).
Natural dedution has a pragmati drawbak. In searhing bakwards for a proof of
a formula, it is not always obvious whih rule to apply. For example, in Intuitionisti
Logi it is not obvious from the onlusion that rule (
"
) should be applied. Even when
the rule has been xed, it is hard to determine the formulae in the premiss. Cut-free
Gentzen sequent alulus systems (Gentzen, 1969) are muh better from this point of
view. When a prinipal formula has been hosen, the rules appliable are restrited. The
appliation of logial rules is direted by the syntax of the prinipal formula. Strutural
rules an often be built into the sequent system. In suh a system, when a prinipal
formula has been hosen, the next rule appliation is exatly determined by the syntax
of that formula.
There are well known translations (Prawitz, 1965) between normal natural dedutions
and sequent proofs. Therefore, one an searh for proofs in sequent alulus systems
and then translate the resulting proofs to normal natural dedutions. The drawbak is
that many sequent proofs translate to the same normal natural dedution. Hene when
one is trying to enumerate all proofs of a formula, the same proof is found many times.
This gives one motivation for `permutation-free' sequent aluli (introdued in (Herbelin,
1995) for Intuitionisti Logi). These are sequent aluli (enabling syntax direted proof
searh) whose proofs an be translated in a 1{1 way with the normal natural dedutions
for the logi. Permutation-free aluli have the advantages of a sequent alulus system,
whilst reeting the struture of normal natural dedutions. The rst alulus desribed
in this paper, PFLAX, is a proof enumeration alulus for rst-order quantied Lax
Logi. PFLAX is a permutation-free alulus for Lax Logi { the sequent proofs naturally
orrespond in a 1{1 way to the normal natural dedutions.
Propositional logis are usually deidable and therefore it is desirable to nd eetive
deision proedures for suh logis. Here, by studying the nature of non-terminating bak-
wards searh to see where one an stop the searh, a deision proedure for propositional
Lax Logi is given; this theorem proving alulus is alled PFLAX
Hist
. The alulus uses
a tehnique for deteting loops using a history mehanism, building on work of Heuerd-
ing et al (Heuerding et al., 1996; Heuerding, 1998; Howe, 1997). It uses the propositional
fragment of PFLAX as the base alulus to whih a history mehanism is added, giv-
ing the deision proedure. The tehnique is general and may be applied to many other
propositional logis. We know of no other deision proedure for propositional Lax Logi.
2. Natural Dedution
This setion gives the relevant material on natural dedution needed to develop the
permutation-free alulus for Lax Logi (the proofs in whih orrespond in a 1{1 way to
normal natural dedutions). A natural dedution alulus for Lax Logi (with rules for
quantiers and falsum added) taken from (Benton et al., 1998), an be seen in Figure 1.
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Fig. 1. Sequent style presentation of natural dedution for Lax Logi.
Normal natural dedutions are the objets of interest. The -redution and ommuting





an be added, and are to be found in (Howe, 1998; Howe, 1999).
Denition 1 A natural dedution is said to be in ; -normal form when no -redutions
and no ommuting onversions are appliable.
We present a restrited version of natural dedution for Lax Logi. In this alulus, the
only dedutions possible are in ; -normal form. This alulus has two kinds of `sequent',
dierentiated by their onsequene relations,  and . Rules are appliable only when
the premisses have the appropriate onsequene relation. The onlusions have a xed
onsequene relation. Thus valid dedutions are of a restrited form. This alulus, whih
we all NLAX, is given (with the proof terms given in the next setion) in Figure 2.
Proposition 1 The alulus NLAX only allows dedutions to whih no -redutions and
no ommuting onversions are appliable. Moreover, it allows all ; -normal dedutions.
2.1. Term Assignment
We give a proof term system for NLAX. The term system is needed to prove the re-
sults given in setion 4. In (Moggi, 1989) Moggi gave a -alulus, whih he alled the
omputational -alulus. As is shown in (Benton et al., 1998), this alulus naturally
mathes Lax Logi. More about the omputational -alulus and Lax Logi (there alled
omputational logi) an be found in (Benton et al., 1998).
Proof terms for unrestrited natural dedution for Lax Logi an be found in (Howe,
1998; Moggi, 1989). We are interested in the `real' proofs for Lax Logi { the normal
natural dedutions. We restrit the terms that an be built, in order that they math
our restrited natural dedution alulus NLAX, giving proof objets. The proof terms
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Fig. 2. NLAX with proof annotations.
ome in two syntati ategories, A and N. V is the ategory of variables (proofs), U
is the ategory of variables (individuals in formulae), and T the ategory of terms. The
proof terms are given with an abstrat syntax, with the notation hosen to be suggestive
of the assoiated proof rules. Hene smhi(N) for the term assoiated with the somehow
introdution rule. The extra onstrutor an(A) mathes the (M) rule of NLAX.
A::= var(V ) j ap(A;N) j fst(A) j snd(A) j apn(A; T )
N ::=  j efq(A) j an(A) j V:N j pr(N;N) j i(N) j j(N) j wn(A; V:N; V:N)
smhi(N) j smhe(A; V:N) j U:N j prq(T;N) j ee(A;U:V:N)
NLAX together with proof annotations for normal terms an be seen in Figure 2.
3. Sequent Calulus
In this setion we present a new Gentzen sequent alulus for Lax Logi, PFLAX. The
proofs allowed by PFLAX naturally orrespond in a 1{1 way to normal natural dedu-
tions for Lax Logi { i.e. the proofs of NLAX. In Figure 3 we remind the reader of the
sequent alulus, extending those in (Fairtlough and Mendler, 1997; Benton et al., 1998)
to quantiers.
We give a new sequent alulus, PFLAX (`permutation-free' Lax Logi). PFLAX ex-
tends the permutation-free alulus MJ for Intuitionisti Logi (Herbelin, 1995; Dykho
and Pinto, 1998; Dykho and Pinto, 1999) to a alulus for Lax Logi. Like MJ this
alulus has two forms of judgment,  ) R and  
Q
 ! R. The rst looks like the usual
kind of sequent; however, only right rules and ontration are appliable to this kind of
Proof Searh in Lax Logi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Fig. 3. Sequent alulus for Lax Logi.
sequent in bakwards proof searh. The seond kind of sequent has a formula (on the
left) in a privileged position alled the stoup, following (Girard, 1991). The formula in
the stoup is always prinipal in the onlusion of an inferene rule. The stoup is a form
of fousing; proof searh is restrited so that, whenever possible, the ative formulae of
an inferene are prinipal in the premiss. In bakwards proof searh, left rules are only
appliable to stoup sequents. PFLAX (together with the proof terms given in the next
setion) is displayed in Figure 4. We give a simple example of a derivation in PFLAX:




B;B; ÆB ^ (B  A)) B
(C)

















B;B; ÆB ^ (B  A)) A
(C)

















B; ÆB ^ (B  A)) ÆA
(C)
3.1. Term Assignment for Sequent Calulus
We give a term assignment system for PFLAX. The term system is a simple extension of
that given in (Herbelin, 1995; Dykho and Pinto, 1996; Dykho and Pinto, 1998). The
term alulus has two syntati ategories, M and Ms. V is the ategory of variables
(proofs), U is the ategory of variables (individuals) and T is the ategory of terms. The
proof terms are given with an abstrat syntax suggestive of the assoiated proof rules.
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P
 ! [ ℄ : P
(ax)
 ; x : P
P
 !Ms : R
 ; x : P ) (x;Ms) : R
(C)
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Fig. 4. The sequent alulus PFLAX, with proof annotations.
In partiular, [ ℄ is used for the axiom term and (M :: Ms) for the term assoiated with
impliation on the left, giving a list of M terms suggestive of the ordering of rules in the
alulus.
M ::=  j (V ;Ms) jV:M j pair(M;M) j inl(M) j inr(M) j smhr(M) jU:M j pairq(T;M)
Ms::= [ ℄ j ae j (M :: Ms) j p(Ms) j q(Ms) j when(V:M; V:M)
smhl(V:M) j apq(T;Ms) j spl(U:V:M)
These terms an easily be typed by PFLAX, as seen in Figure 4.
4. Equivalene of the Caluli
We prove the equivalene of the term aluli and the soundness and adequay of PFLAX.
These results prove the desired orrespondene. The proofs are extensions of those for
the MJ alulus for Intuitionisti Logi (Dykho and Pinto, 1998), hene most detail is
omitted. We start by giving pairs of funtions that dene translations between the term
assignment systems for natural dedution (NLAX) and sequent alulus (PFLAX), ex-
tending to Lax Logi those of (Herbelin, 1995; Dykho and Pinto, 1998) for Intuitionisti
Logi.
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Sequent Calulus ! Natural Dedution:












































(A; spl(u:y:M)) = ee(A; u:y:(M))
(pairq(t;M))=prq(t; (M))
Natural Dedution ! Sequent Calulus:





(A; [ ℄)  
0
(var(x);Ms)=(x;Ms)




(A; ( (N) :: Ms))
 (smhe(A; x:N))= 
0


















































 (prq(t;N))=pairq(t;  (N))
 (ee(A; u:y:N))= 
0
(A; spl(u:y: (N)))
We give two lemmas demonstrating the equivalene of the term aluli, that is, the
translations from one system to the other are 1{1.
Lemma 1 i)  ((M)) = M ; ii)  (
0
(A;Ms)) =  
0
(A;Ms).
Proof. By simultaneous indution on the struture of M and Ms. For full details see
(Howe, 1999).





Proof. By simultaneous indution on the struture of N and A. For full details see
(Howe, 1999).
The following two theorems state soundness and adequay. They show that the trans-
lations respet provability, that is, no `sequent' (and hene its assoiated term) an be
proved in one system, but not its translation in the other.
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Proof. By simultaneous indution on the struture of M and Ms. For full details see
(Howe, 1999).
Theorem 2 (Adequay) The following rules are admissible:
 N : R
 )  (N) : R
i)







Proof. By simultaneous indution on the struture of A and N . For full details see
(Howe, 1999).
Sine the term systems are in 1{1 orrespondene (lemma 1 and lemma 2) and the
translations preserve provability (theorem 1 and theorem 2), the 1{1 orrespondene
between PFLAX and NLAX has been established. This is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 3 The normal natural dedutions of Lax Logi (the proofs of NLAX) are in
1{1 orrespondene to the proofs of PFLAX.
An immediate orollary of theorem 3 is that PFLAX is sound and omplete with respet
to natural dedution for Lax Logi. Quantied Lax Logi is demonstrated to be sound
and omplete with respet to ertain lasses of Kripke model-strutures in (Fairtlough
and Walton, 1997).
4.1. Cut Elimination
We now briey disuss ut for PFLAX. In the usual sequent alulus, ut may be for-
mulated as follows:
 ) P  ; P ) Q
 ) Q
(ut)
In PFLAX, the two judgment forms lead to the following four ut rules (as for Intuition-

































We all PFLAX extended with the four ut rules PFLAX
ut
. We an give redution rules
for PFLAX
ut
and prove the weak ut elimination theorem for the logi. We an also
prove strong normalisation for the term system assoiated with the logi, hene strong
ut-elimination. Details and proofs (extending those for Intuitionisti Logi in (Herbelin,
1995; Dykho and Pinto, 1998)) an be found in (Howe, 1998).
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) are admissible in PFLAX.
Theorem 5 The ut redution system for PFLAX strongly normalises.
5. Deiding Lax Logi
It is useful and interesting to have a deision proedure for any logi. This setion de-
sribes a deision proedure for propositional Lax Logi. To the best of our knowledge,
no deision proedure for propositional Lax Logi has been presented before.
The new alulus uses a history mehanism to ensure termination of bakwards proof
searh. History mehanisms were introdued in (Heuerding et al., 1996; Heuerding, 1998).
The rened history mehanism used here an be found in (Howe, 1997; Howe, 1998).
Another approah to deiding propositional logis is by the use of `ontration-free'
sequent aluli, suh as the one for propositional Intuitionisti Logi given in (Dykho,
1992; Hudelmaier, 1993). If suh a deision proedure for Lax Logi ould be found,
we would expet it to be faster than one involving a history mehanism. An investi-
gation of ontration-free aluli for Lax Logi an be found in (Avellone and Ferrari,
1996). Unfortunately, this investigation did not sueed in nding a ontration-free
alulus. We believe that a ontration-free alulus for Lax Logi annot be found,
as (for arbitrary n) examples an be onstruted whih require an entire formula in
a sequent to be ontrated n times in a proof. As an example, onsider the sequent
B  (ÆA  C)  ÆA; ÆB; ÆA  C ) C, where ÆA  C needs to dupliated in its entirety
in order to prove the sequent.
5.1. Deiding Propositional Logis Using History Mehanisms
One approah to nding a deision proedure for a propositional logi is to plae on-
ditions on the sequent alulus to ensure termination of searh. It is elegant to be able
to build the ontent of these onditions into the sequent alulus itself. This is how the
alulus for theorem proving in this setion is developed.
In order to ensure termination of bakward proof searh, we need to hek that the
same sequent (modulo number of ourrenes of idential formulae) does not appear
again on a branh, that is, proof searh does not loop. Avoiding loops an also prevent
the unneessary omputation arising from a nite number of passes through a loop in a
suessful derivation. We need a mehanial way to detet suh loops. One way to do this
is to add a history to a sequent. The history is the set of all sequents to have ourred so
far on a branh of a proof tree. After eah bakwards inferene the new sequent (without
its history) is heked to see whether it is a member of this set. If it is we have looping
and baktrak. If not, the new history is the extension of the old history by the old
sequent (without the history omponent), and we try to prove the new sequent, and so
on. Unfortunately, this method is spae ineÆient as it requires long lists of sequents to
be stored by the omputer, and all of this list has to be heked at eah stage. When
the sequents are stored, far more information than neessary is kept. EÆieny would be
improved by utting down the amount of storage and heking needed to prevent looping.
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The basis of the redued history is the realisation, as in (Heuerding et al., 1996), that
one need only store goal formulae (a goal formula is the suedent of a sequent) in order
to loop-hek. In the aluli dealt with in this paper, one a formula is in the ontext it
will be in the ontext of all sequents above it in the proof tree. We say that the alulus
has inreasing ontext. For two sequents to be the same they need to have the same
ontext (up to multiple ourrenes of formulae). Therefore we may empty the history
every time the ontext is (properly) extended. All we need store in the history are goal
formulae. If we ome to a sequent whose goal is already in the history, then it has the
same goal and the same ontext as another sequent { there is a loop.
There are two slightly dierent approahes apturing this. There is the straightforward
extension of the alulus desribed in (Heuerding et al., 1996), whih we all the `Swiss
history'; more on this loop-heking method an be found in (Heuerding, 1998). There is
also related work on histories for Intuitionisti Logi in (Gabbay, 1991). Another approah
involves storing slightly more formulae in the history, but whih for some aluli detets
loops more quikly. This we desribe as the `Sottish history' (Howe, 1997); it an, in
many ases, be more eÆient than the Swiss method. In this paper we give a alulus
for Lax Logi using the Sottish history as we believe this to be the better method for
intuitionisti logis (Howe, 1997).
The generality of this approah is attrative. The history mehanism an be attahed
to many aluli to give deision proedures; appliations an be found in (Howe, 1998).
5.2. PFLAX
Hist
This setion desribes a history alulus for propositional Lax Logi. The alulus is
an extension of that for Intuitionisti Logi given in (Howe, 1997). The modality is
handled similarly to disjuntion (disjuntion is not overed in (Heuerding et al., 1996),
and requires speial treatment). It uses the alulus PFLAX as a base on whih to build
the alulus as this alulus has already redued the searh spae to a ertain extent.
PFLAX has the inreasing ontext required for the appliation of the history mehanism.
However, a more usual formulation ould have been used instead. PFLAX
Hist
an be seen
in Figure 5. Observe the two rules for (
R
). These orrespond to the two ases where
the new formula is or is not in the ontext. As noted above, this is very important for
history mehanisms. Notie that the number of formulae in the history is at most equal
to the length of the formula we hek for provability.
A sequent is mathed against the onlusions of right rules until the goal formula is
either a propositional variable, falsum, disjuntion or a Æ formula This has been ensured
by the restrition on goal formulae given in the alulus (note that the rules for disjuntion
on the right and somehow on the right are only possible on baktraking, or with an empty
ontext). A formula from the ontext is then seleted using the rule (C) and mathed
against the left rules of the alulus. The Sottish alulus keeps (as a set) a omplete
reord of goal formulae between ontext extensions. At eah of the plaes where the
history might be extended, the new goal is heked against the history. If it is in the
history, then there is a loop, hene failure and baktraking.
There are other plaes where the rules are restrited to prevent looping. Where ne-
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D is either an atom, ?, disjuntion or a Æ formula. Where the history has been extended
we have parenthesised (P;H) for emphasis.
Fig. 5. The alulus PFLAX
Hist
(Sottish).
essary, the left rules have side onditions to ensure that the ontext is inreasing. For
the (
R
) rule (whih attempts to extend the ontext) there are two ases orresponding
to when the ontext is and when it is not extended. Something similar is happening in
the left rules. Take (_
L
) as an example. In both premisses of the rule a formula may
be added to ontext. If both ontexts really are extended, then we ontinue building
the proof tree. If one or both ontexts are not extended then the sequent, S, with the
non-extended ontext, will be the same as some sequent at a lesser height in the proof
tree { there is a loop (whih we desribe as a trivial loop). This is easy to see: sine the
ontext and the goal of S are the same as that of the onlusion, there must be a lower
sequent (the onlusion of an instane of (C)) the same as the premiss S. As an example
we give a derivation in PFLAX
Hist
of the sequent in the example in setion 3:




B; ÆB ^ (B  A)) B
(C)

















B; ÆB ^ (B  A)) A
(C)
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Note that the derivation of this sequent given in setion 3 would be prevented by the
history mehanism, as it ontains a loop.
It is now demonstrated that PFLAX
Hist
is equivalent to PFLAX, in terms of prov-





is the alulus PFLAX where the rule (C) is restrited so that it is only ap-
pliable when the goal formula is an atom, a disjuntion, falsum or a somehow formula.
Proposition 2 The alulus PFLAX is equivalent to the alulus PFLAX
D
. That is,
sequent  ) G is provable in PFLAX i  ) G is provable in PFLAX
D
.
The following lemma is needed in the proof of theorem 6.
Lemma 3 (Contration) The following rules are admissible in PFLAX
Hist
:
 ; P; P ) R;H













Proof. By simultaneous indution on the heights of derivations of premisses.
The equivalene proof below, although long, has a simple struture. An algorithm to
turn a PFLAX proof tree into a PFLAX
Hist
proof tree is desribed in detail. A simple
indution argument shows that the algorithm terminates, proving the result.
Theorem 6 The aluli PFLAX and PFLAX
Hist
are equivalent. That is, sequent  ) G
is provable in PFLAX i sequent  ) G; fGg is provable in PFLAX
Hist
.










. (Use ontration (C
0
) above instanes of (
R
2
) and then simply drop the
history part of the sequent). We prove the onverse.
Take any proof tree for sequent  ) G in PFLAX
D
. By denition this proof tree is
nite, with n > 0 nodes. Using this proof tree, we onstrut (from the root up) a proof
tree for the sequent  ) G; fGg in PFLAX
Hist




is that the former permits loops, whereas the latter does not. Essentially
we take the PFLAX
D
proof tree and give a reipe for `snipping out' the loops: removing
the sequents that form the loop.
The onstrution uses `hybrid trees'. A hybrid tree is a fragment of a PFLAX
Hist
proof
tree with all branhes that do not have (ax), (>) or (?) leaves ending with PFLAX
D
proof trees. These PFLAX
D
proof trees have roots whih an be obtained by bakwards
appliation of a PFLAX
D
rule to the top history sequent (ignoring its history). We
analyse eah ase of a topmost history sequent with non-history premiss(es) resulting
from appliation of rule (R) in the sequent tree. We write     
0
when the set of
formulae in multisets   and  
0
are the same (although the number of ourrenes may
be dierent). We denote a series of zero or more instanes of rule (R) by (R)

. We give
the proof for the Æ; fragment.
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{ The root of the PFLAX
D
tree. We hange (non-history) sequent  ) G to history
sequent  ) G; fGg.
{ (R) is one of (ax), (C), i.e. a rule whih in PFLAX
Hist
has no side onditions. The
premiss is hanged by adding the appropriate history. It beomes the history sequent
obtained by applying (bakwards) the PFLAX
Hist
rule to the original onlusion. For




 ; P ) D;H




 ; P ) D;H
(C)
We now have a new hybrid tree.
{ (R) is (
R
). If the ontext is extended, then add the appropriate history, allowing










. If the ontext is not extended and the new goal is not in the history,





by an instane of (
R
2




. If the new
goal is in the history, there is a loop, whih the history mehanism prevents. If the
history ondition is not met, then below the onlusion the hybrid tree has the form:
 ; P ) G
















 H and     
0
. The history is not reset at any point in this
fragment. This an easily be seen to ontain the loop whih is the reason for the
history ondition not being met. It is transformed by removing all sequents above,




(along with any subtrees above exised sequents) up
to  ; P ) G. Adding the appropriate history to this sequent and using (one or more
instanes of) (C
0
) gives the new hybrid tree:










{ (R) is (
L
). If the history ondition is satised, then add the appropriate history,









. If the history ondition is not satised, then below the onlusion the






















 H and     
0
. The history is not reset at any point in this





(along with any subtrees above exised sequents) up to  ) P . The se-
quent  
Q
 ! R and the subtree above it are also removed. Adding the appropriate
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history to  ) P and using (zero or more instanes of) (C
0












{ (R) is (Æ
R
). If the history ondition is satised, then add the appropriate history,









. If the history ondition is not satised, then below the onlusion the


















 H and     
0
. The history is not reset at any point in this frag-




(along with any subtrees above exised sequents) up to  ) P . Adding the appropri-
ate history and using (zero or more instanes of) (C
0











{ (R) is (Æ
L
). If the side ondition is satised, then add the appropriate history, al-









. If the side ondition is not satised, then below the onlusion the
hybrid tree has form:












where P 2  . This is transformed by removing all sequents from, but not inluding,
 ) ÆR;H (along with any subtrees above exised sequents) up to  ; P ) ÆR. Adding
the appropriate history and using a single instane of (C
0
) gives the new hybrid tree:





Sine the number of sequents without a history in a hybrid tree is nite and as every step
stritly dereases the number of sequents without a history, this proess is terminating.
The instanes of (C
0
) may be eliminated from the onstruted derivation.
Note that the PFLAX derivation given in setion 3 is transformed by the algorithm
desribed in the proof to the derivation of the same sequent in PFLAX
Hist
given above.
We have shown that PFLAX
Hist
is sound and omplete. To prove that it is a deision
proedure, we prove that it is also terminating { bakwards proof searh in the alulus
ends in suess or failure after a nite number of steps.
Theorem 7 Bakwards proof searh in the alulus PFLAX
Hist
is terminating.
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Proof. We assoiate with every sequent a quintuple of natural numbers. With a sequent
without a stoup,  ) R;H, we assoiate: W = (k   n; k   m; 1; 0; r). With a sequent
with a stoup,  
P
 ! R;H, we assoiate:W = (k n; k m; 0; s; r). Here, k is the number
of elements in the set of subformulae of ( ; R); n is the number of elements in the set of
elements of  ;m is the number of elements inH; r is the size of goal formula R and s is the
size of the stoup formula P . (Notie that although   is a multiset, we ount its elements
as a set). These quintuples are lexiographially ordered from the left. By inspetion we
see that for every inferene rule W for the premisses is lower in the lexiographi order
than W for the onlusion. Hene bakward proof searh is terminating.
When implementing a theorem prover, knowledge of the invertibility of the inferene
rules an be useful. This information is given in the following proposition.

























). The following inferene rules of PFLAX
Hist
















This paper has presented two proof searh aluli for Lax Logi. The rst, PFLAX,
is a sequent alulus for rst-order quantied Lax Logi. The proofs allowed by this
alulus naturally orrespond in a 1{1 way to the normal natural dedutions for rst-order
quantied Lax Logi. The alulus is well suited for enumerating, without redundany,
all proofs in the logi. This makes the alulus useful in ontexts where proof searh is
for normal natural dedutions, suh as in (onstraint) logi programming.
The seond alulus, PFLAX
Hist
, builds on the propositional fragment of the rst
alulus to give a deision proedure for propositional Lax Logi. Propositional Lax
Logi has been used in hardware veriation and PFLAX
Hist
ould be of use in this
area. The alulus works by adding a history mehanism to the propositional alulus
to prevent looping. This tehnique is general and may be applied to a wide range of
sequent aluli for propositional logis to yield deision proedures. We believe that, to
date, PFLAX
Hist
is the only eetive deision proedure for propositional Lax Logi.
Aknowledgements I would like to thank Roy Dykho for his helpful advie during many
useful and interesting disussions.
Referenes
Avellone, A. and Ferrari, M. (1996). Almost Dupliation-free Tableau Caluli for Propositional
Lax Logis. In TABLEAUX'96, volume 1071 of Leture Notes in Artiial Intelligene, pages
48{64. Springer-Verlag.
Benton, P. N., Bierman, G. M., and de Paiva, V. (1998). Computational Types from a Logial
Perspetive. Journal of Funtional Programming, 8(2):177{193.
Curry, H. B. (1952). The Elimination Theorem When Modality is Present. Journal of Symboli
Logi, 17(4):249{65.
Jaob M. Howe 16
Dykho, R. (1992). Contration-Free Sequent Caluli for Intuitionisti Logi. Journal of
Symboli Logi, 57(3):795{807.
Dykho, R. and Pinto, L. (1996). A Permutation-free Sequent Calulus for Intuitionisti Logi.
Tehnial Report CS/96/9, University of St Andrews.
Dykho, R. and Pinto, L. (1998). Cut-Elimination and a Permutation-free Sequent Calulus
for Intuitionisti Logi. Studia Logi, 60:107{118.
Dykho, R. and Pinto, L. (1999). Permutability of Proofs in Intuitionisti Sequent Caluli.
Theoretial Computer Siene, 212(1-2):141{155.
Fairtlough, M. and Mendler, M. (1994). An Intuitionisti Modal Logi with Appliations to the
Formal Veriation of Hardware. In Computer Siene Logi, pages 354{68. Springer-Verlag.
Fairtlough, M. and Mendler, M. (1997). Propositional Lax Logi. Information and Computation,
137(1):1{33.
Fairtlough, M., Mendler, M., and Walton, M. (1997). First-order Lax Logi as a Framework for
Constraint Logi Programming. Tehnial Report MIPS-9714, University of Passau.
Fairtlough, M. and Walton, M. (1997). Quantied Lax Logi. Tehnial Report CS-97-11,
University of SheÆeld.
Gabbay, D. (1991). Algorithmi Proof with Diminishing Resoures, part 1. In Computer Siene
Logi 1990, volume 533 of Leture Notes in Computer Siene, pages 156{173. Springer-Verlag.
Gentzen, G. (1969). The Colleted Papers of Gerhard Gentzen. North-Holland, Amsterdam.
Edited M. E. Szabo.
Girard, J.-Y. (1991). A New Construtive Logi: Classial Logi. Mathematial Strutures in
Computer Siene, 1:255{296.
Herbelin, H. (1995). A -alulus Struture Isomorphi to Gentzen-style Sequent Calulus
Struture. In Paholski, L. and Tiuryn, J., editors, Computer Siene Logi 1994, volume 933
of Leture Notes in Computer Siene, pages 61{75. Springer-Verlag.
Heuerding, A. (1998). Sequent Caluli for Proof Searh in Some Modal Logis. PhD thesis,
Universitat Bern.
Heuerding, A., Seyfried, M., and Zimmermann, H. (1996). EÆient Loop-Chek for Bakward
Proof Searh in Some Non-lassial Propositional Logis. In TABLEAUX'96, volume 933,
pages 61{75. Springer-Verlag.
Howe, J. M. (1997). Two Loop Detetion Mehanisms: a Comparison. Leture Notes in Artiial
Intelligene, 1227:188{200.
Howe, J. M. (1998). Proof Searh Issues in Some Non-Classial Logis. PhD thesis, Uni-
versity of St Andrews. Available as Tehnial Report CS/99/1 and eletronially from
http://www.s.uk.a.uk/people/staff/jmh1.
Howe, J. M. (1999). Proof Searh in Lax Logi. Tehnial Report 14-99, University of Kent.
Hudelmaier, J. (1993). An O(n log n)-spae Deision Proedure for Intuitionisti Propositional
Logi. Journal of Logi and Computation, 3(1):63{75.
Mendler, M. (1993). A Modal Logi for Handling Behavioural Constraints in Formal Hardware
Veriation. PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh. ECS-LFCS-93-255.
Miller, D., Nadathur, G., Pfenning, F., and Sedrov, A. (1991). Uniform Proofs as a Foundation
for Logi Programming. Annals of Pure and Applied Logi, 51(1-2):125{157.
Moggi, E. (1989). Computational Lambda-Calulus and Monads. In Logi in Computer Siene
'89, pages 14{23.
Prawitz, D. (1965). Natural Dedution, volume 3 of Stokholm Studies in Philosophy. Almqvist
& Wiksell, Stokholm.
Walton, M. (1998). First-Order Lax Logi: A Framework for Abstration, Constraints and
Renements. PhD thesis, University of SheÆeld.
